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Tuomas Sandholm Vis

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*2009
197EESam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Equilibria in Multiplayer Stochastic Games of Imperfect Information. IJCAI 2009: 140-146
196EEAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: How Pervasive Is the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility? IJCAI 2009: 233-238
195EEPranjal Awasthi, Tuomas Sandholm: Online Stochastic Optimization in the Large: Application to Kidney Exchange. IJCAI 2009: 405-411
194EEMichael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm: Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions. IJCAI 2009: 46-52
193EEAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. SAGT 2009: 60-71
192EEMichael Benisch, Patrick Gage Kelley, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm, Janice Y. Tsai, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Paul Hankes Drielsma: The impact of expressiveness on the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms for location-sharing. SOUPS 2009
2008
191 Lance Fortnow, John Riedl, Tuomas Sandholm: Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL, USA, June 8-12, 2008 ACM 2008
190 Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Expectation-Based Versus Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction in Imperfect Information Games: An Experimental Comparison Using Poker. AAAI 2008: 1454-1457
189 William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier: Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI 2008: 1499-1502
188 Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm: A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms. AAAI 2008: 17-23
187 Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh: Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI 2008: 30-37
186 Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: First-Order Algorithm with O(ln(1/e)) Convergence for e-Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games. AAAI 2008: 75-82
185EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information. AAMAS (2) 2008: 903-910
184EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: A heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker player: discretized betting models and automatically generated equilibrium-finding programs. AAMAS (2) 2008: 911-918
183EESam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for 3-player no-limit Texas Hold'em tournaments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 919-925
182EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: GS3 and Tartanian: game theory-based heads-up limit and no-limit Texas Hold'em poker-playing programs. AAMAS (Demos) 2008: 1647-1648
181EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2): (2008)
2007
180 Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational Issues in Social Choice, 21.10. - 26.10.2007 Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007
179 Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction of Sequential Games, and Holistic Equilibrium Analysis of Texas Hold'em Poker. AAAI 2007: 50-57
178 Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities. AAAI 2007: 58-65
177EETuomas Sandholm: Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $25 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AAIM 2007: 426
176EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Better automated abstraction techniques for imperfect information games, with application to Texas Hold'em poker. AAMAS 2007: 192
175EEDavid J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 295-304
174EEUlle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: 07431 Abstracts Collection - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007
173EEUlle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: 07431 Executive Summary - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007
172EETuomas Sandholm: Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing: how we conducted $35 billion of generalized combinatorial auctions. ICEC 2007: 349-350
171EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham: Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214
170EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Incremental Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256
169EETuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier: Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506
168EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-Theoretic Approaches to Branching in Search. IJCAI 2007: 2286-2292
167EEAndrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. WINE 2007: 57-69
166EETuomas Sandholm: Perspectives on multiagent learning. Artif. Intell. 171(7): 382-391 (2007)
165EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007)
164EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games. J. ACM 54(5): (2007)
163EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007)
2006
162 Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006
161 Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: A Competitive Texas Hold'em Poker Player via Automated Abstraction and Real-Time Equilibrium Computation. AAAI 2006
160 Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets. AAAI 2006
159 Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing. AAAI 2006
158 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006
157EETuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. AAMAS 2006: 1127-1134
156EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: A Texas Hold'em poker player based on automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation. AAMAS 2006: 1453-1454
155EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528
154EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544
153EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. AAMAS 2006: 545-547
152EEAndrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 160-169
151EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90
150EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006)
149EEAvrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Online algorithms for market clearing. J. ACM 53(5): 845-879 (2006)
2005
148 Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005 IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005
147 Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Optimal Rhode Island Hold'em Poker. AAAI 2005: 1684-1685
146 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi: Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254
145 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260
144 Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2005: 267-274
143 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488
142 Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer: Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501
141 Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515
140EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. AAMAS 2005: 357-364
139EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism design and deliberative agents. AAMAS 2005: 650-656
138EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity of common voting rules. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87
137EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of (iterated) dominance. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97
136EEDaniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: 05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005
135EEDaniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: 05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005
134EETuomas Sandholm: Automated Mechanism Design. Computing and Markets 2005
133EETuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. Computing and Markets 2005
132EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham: Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. Computing and Markets 2005
131EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312
130EEMakoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669
129EEMakoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64
128EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Unconditional privacy in social choice. TARK 2005: 207-218
127EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152
2004
126 Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields: Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions. AAAI 2004: 204-211
125 Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm: Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218
124 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225
123 Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2004: 232-237
122 Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control. AAAI 2004: 73-79
121EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135
120EEAnshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids. AAMAS 2004: 1418-1419
119EEWolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies. AAMAS 2004: 254-260
118EEBenoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 386-393
117EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 394-401
116EEFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 810-817
115EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141
114EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263
113EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 264-265
112EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267
111EEAnton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 268-269
110EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60
109EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14
108EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents. AMEC 2004: 87-100
107EEPaolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16
106EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004
105EEAvrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research 5: 649-667 (2004)
2003
104EEBenoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2003: 1014-1015
103EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing. AAMAS 2003: 273-280
102EEMartin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 176-185
101EEWolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 196-197
100EEAnton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 212-213
99EEBenoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Using value queries in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 226-227
98EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231
97EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233
96EEAnshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 236-237
95EETuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. AMEC 2003: 73-91
94EEAnton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions. AMEC 2003: 92-108
93EESviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders. CEC 2003: 363-
92EEAvrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. COLT 2003: 13-25
91EETuomas Sandholm: Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms. CP 2003: 19-36
90EETuomas Sandholm: Terminating Decision Algorithms Optimally. CP 2003: 950-955
89EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24
88 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90
87 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98
86 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106
85 Tuomas Sandholm: Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing. IJCAI 2003: 1649-
84 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618
83 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. IJCAI 2003: 765-771
82 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788
81EEXiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm: Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time. NIPS 2003
80EEVincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214
79EESubhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede: Compressing Two-Dimensional Routing Tables. Algorithmica 35(4): 287-300 (2003)
78EETuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artif. Intell. 145(1-2): 33-58 (2003)
77EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems CoRR cs.AI/0307017: (2003)
76EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents CoRR cs.GT/0307002: (2003)
75EEVincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003: (2003)
74EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games CoRR cs.GT/0307006: (2003)
73EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core CoRR cs.GT/0307016: (2003)
72EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard CoRR cs.GT/0307018: (2003)
2002
71 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319
70 Tuomas Sandholm, Xiao Feng Wang: (Im)possibility of Safe Exchange Mechanism Design. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 338-344
69 Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 367-372
68 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397
67EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents. AAMAS 2002: 135-142
66EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Bidders with hard valuation problems. AAMAS 2002: 160-161
65EEWolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2002: 168-169
64EESviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation. AAMAS 2002: 310-311
63EETuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. AAMAS 2002: 69-76
62EEWolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 34-51
61EEBenoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 69-86
60EETuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Market Clearing with Supply and Demand Curves. ISAAC 2002: 600-611
59EEXiaofeng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm: Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games. NIPS 2002: 1571-1578
58EEAvrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Online algorithms for market clearing. SODA 2002: 971-980
57 Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design. UAI 2002: 103-110
56 Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems. AI Magazine 23(3): 89-100 (2002)
55EETuomas Sandholm: Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artif. Intell. 135(1-2): 1-54 (2002)
54EETuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou: Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts. Artif. Intell. 142(2): 239-264 (2002)
53EEBenoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions CoRR cs.GT/0205066: (2002)
52EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness CoRR cs.GT/0205073: (2002)
51EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria CoRR cs.GT/0205074: (2002)
50EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Mechanism Design CoRR cs.GT/0205075: (2002)
49EEVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates CoRR cs.GT/0205076: (2002)
48 Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust. Computational Intelligence 18(4): 501-514 (2002)
47 Tuomas Sandholm: eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. Computational Intelligence 18(4): 656-676 (2002)
2001
46EEWolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2001: 256-259
45 Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2001: 1102-1108
44 Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Market Clearability. IJCAI 2001: 1145-1151
43EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artif. Intell. 132(2): 183-217 (2001)
2000
42 Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 48-55
41 Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 90-97
40EETuomas Sandholm: eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server. Agents 2000: 341-348
39EEMartin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation. ICDCS 2000: 154-160
38EETuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou: Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts. ICMAS 2000: 247-254
37EETuomas Sandholm, Vincent Ferrandon: Safe Exchange Planner. ICMAS 2000: 255-262
36EESviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies. ICMAS 2000: 71-78
35EESubhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede: Optimal Flow Aggregation. SWAT 2000: 462-475
34 Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 3(1): 73-96 (2000)
33EETuomas Sandholm: Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Decision Support Systems 28(1-2): 165-176 (2000)
32EETuomas Sandholm, Qianbo Huai: Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House. IEEE Internet Computing 4(2): 80-86 (2000)
31 Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study. J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 12(1): 23-42 (2000)
1999
30 Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 11-16
29 Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Time-Quality Tradeoffs in Reallocative Negotiation with Combinatorial Contract Types. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 3-10
28 Tuomas Sandholm, Nir Vulkan: Bargaining with Deadlines. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 44-51
27 Tuomas Sandholm: eMediator: a Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 923-924
26EESviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Contracting with uncertain level of trust. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 1999: 15-21
25EEKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study. Agents 1999: 40-47
24 Tuomas Sandholm, Sandeep Sikka, Samphel Norden: Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts. IJCAI 1999: 535-541
23 Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 1999: 542-547
22EETuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artif. Intell. 111(1-2): 209-238 (1999)
21EETuomas Sandholm: Automated Negotiation. Commun. ACM 42(3): 84-85 (1999)
20EEFernando Tohmé, Tuomas Sandholm: Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-rational Self-interested Agents. J. Log. Comput. 9(6): 793-815 (1999)
1998
19 Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 38-45
18 Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 46-53
17EEMartin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Sequencing of Contract Types for Anytime Task Reallocation. AMET 1998: 54-69
16EEHyacinth S. Nwana, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Tuomas Sandholm, Carles Sierra, Pattie Maes, Robert H. Guttman: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, Challenges and Some Viewpoints. Agents 1998: 189-196
15EETuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. CIA 1998: 113-134
14EETuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation. ICMAS 1998: 10-11
13EEMartin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents. ICMAS 1998: 26-33
12EETuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees CoRR cs.MA/9810005: (1998)
1997
11 Tuomas Sandholm, Fredrik Ygge: On the Gains and Losses of Speculation in Equilibrium Markets. IJCAI (1) 1997: 632-639
10EETuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents. Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 99-137 (1997)
9 Tuomas Sandholm: Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions. IEEE Internet Computing 1(6): 47-54 (1997)
1996
8 Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 126-133
7 Tuomas Sandholm: A Second Order Parameter for 3SAT. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 259-265
1995
6 Tuomas Sandholm, Robert H. Crites: On Multiagent Q-Learning in a Semi-Competitive Domain. Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems 1995: 191-205
5 Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework. ICMAS 1995: 328-335
4 Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents. IJCAI (1) 1995: 662-671
3 Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Equilibrium Analysis of the Possibilities of Unenforced Exchange in Multiagent Systems. IJCAI (1) 1995: 694-703
1994
2 Daniel E. Neiman, David W. Hildum, Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas Sandholm: Exploiting Meta-Level information in a Distributed Scheduling System. AAAI 1994: 394-400
1993
1 Tuomas Sandholm: An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations. AAAI 1993: 256-262

Coauthor Index

1David J. Abraham [175]
2Martin Andersson [12] [13] [17] [18] [19] [22] [29] [39]
3Pranjal Awasthi [195]
4Michael Benisch [160] [188] [192] [194]
5Avrim Blum [58] [92] [102] [105] [149] [175]
6Craig Boutilier [126] [169] [187] [189]
7Felix Brandt [116] [128] [131] [132] [140] [171] [181]
8Sviatoslav Braynov (Sviatoslav Brainov) [26] [30] [36] [48] [64] [93]
9Wolfram Conen [46] [62] [65] [69] [101] [119]
10Vincent Conitzer [49] [50] [51] [52] [57] [68] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [80] [82] [83] [84] [86] [87] [88] [89] [97] [98] [106] [107] [109] [110] [112] [114] [115] [121] [124] [125] [127] [129] [130] [137] [138] [141] [142] [143] [145] [146] [150] [151] [154] [155] [158] [162] [163] [165] [169] [170]
11Lorrie Faith Cranor [192]
12Robert H. Crites [6]
13George B. Davis [160]
14Jonathan Derryberry [125]
15Paul Hankes Drielsma [192]
16Ulrich Endriss (Ulle Endriss) [173] [174] [180]
17Vincent Ferrandon [37]
18Lance Fortnow [191]
19Sam Ganzfried [183] [197]
20Andrew Gilpin [45] [63] [95] [133] [142] [147] [152] [153] [156] [157] [161] [164] [167] [168] [176] [179] [182] [184] [185] [186] [190]
21Robert H. Guttman [16]
22Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi (MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi) [178]
23David W. Hildum [2]
24Samid Hoda [167]
25Qianbo Huai [32]
26Benoît Hudson [53] [61] [99] [104] [118]
27Atsushi Iwasaki [129] [130] [141] [162]
28Jeffrey C. Jackson [92] [105]
29Patrick Gage Kelley [192]
30Robert D. Kleinberg (Robert Kleinberg) [178]
31Anshul Kothari [96] [120]
32Jérôme Lang [75] [80] [165] [173] [174] [180]
33Kate Larson [12] [18] [22] [25] [31] [42] [43] [66] [67] [103] [108] [113] [117] [122] [139]
34Daniel J. Lehmann [135] [136] [148]
35Victor R. Lesser [2] [3] [4] [5] [8] [10] [56]
36David Levine [45] [63]
37Anton Likhodedov [94] [100] [111] [123] [144]
38Pattie Maes [16]
39Kohki Maruono [162]
40Rudolf Müller [135] [136] [148]
41Daniel E. Neiman [2]
42Samphel Norden [24]
43Hyacinth S. Nwana [16]
44Naoki Ohta [129] [130] [141] [162]
45Abraham Othman [193] [196]
46David C. Parkes [187] [189]
47Javier Peña [167] [186]
48John Riedl [191]
49Jeffrey S. Rosenschein [16]
50Francesca Rossi [173] [174] [180]
51Norman M. Sadeh [188] [192] [194]
52Paolo Santi [107] [146]
53Onn Shehory [12] [18] [22]
54Rob Shields [126]
55Yoav Shoham [132] [171]
56Carles Sierra [16]
57Sandeep Sikka [24]
58Troels Bjerre Sørensen [179] [182] [184]
59Subhash Suri [35] [41] [44] [45] [60] [63] [78] [79] [96] [120]
60Fernando A. Tohmé (Fernando Tohmé) [12] [18] [20] [22]
61Janice Y. Tsai [192]
62Nir Vulkan [28]
63William E. Walsh [187] [189]
64Xiao Feng Wang [70] [81]
65Xiaofeng Wang [59]
66Priyank Ramesh Warkhede [35] [79]
67Fredrik Ygge [11]
68Makoto Yokoo [129] [130] [141] [162]
69Yunhong Zhou [38] [54]
70Martin Zinkevich [58] [92] [102] [105] [149]

Colors in the list of coauthors

Copyright © Tue Nov 3 08:52:44 2009 by Michael Ley (ley@uni-trier.de)