Shahar Dobzinski Vis

*	2009
20	EE	Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi: An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2009: 169-176
19	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem. SAGT 2009: 14-23
18	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi: On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design CoRR abs/0904.4193: (2009)
17	EE	Shahar Dobzinski: A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms CoRR abs/0907.5219: (2009)
	2008
16	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan: On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2008: 38-47
15	EE	Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden: Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. FOCS 2008: 15-24
14	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan: Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS 2008: 260-269
13	EE	Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer: Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. SAGT 2008: 170-181
12	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan: Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? SAGT 2008: 327-336
11	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel D. Procaccia: Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. WINE 2008: 653-664
	2007
10	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 346-351
9	EE	Shahar Dobzinski: Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. APPROX-RANDOM 2007: 89-103
8	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. STOC 2007: 338-344
7	EE	Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski: Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 25(6): 1224-1236 (2007)
6	EE	Shahar Dobzinski: Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms? SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 30-33 (2007)
	2006
5	EE	Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski: Welfare maximization in congestion games. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 52-61
4	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira: An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. SODA 2006: 1064-1073
3	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira: Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. STOC 2006: 644-652
2	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan: Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 13(074): (2006)
	2005
1	EE	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira: Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. STOC 2005: 610-618

Coauthor Index

1	Itai Ashlagi	[20]
2	Liad Blumrosen	[5] [7]
3	Richard Cole	[13]
4	Peerapong Dhangwatnotai	[15]
5	Shaddin Dughmi	[15] [18]
6	Lisa Fleischer	[13]
7	Ron Lavi	[14] [20]
8	Aranyak Mehta	[12]
9	Noam Nisan	[1] [2] [3] [8] [10] [14] [19]
10	Ariel D. Procaccia	[11]
11	Tim Roughgarden	[12] [15]
12	Michael Schapira	[1] [3] [4]
13	Mukund Sundararajan	[12] [16]

Colors in the list of coauthors