9. TARK 2003: Bloomington, Indiana, USA

• Andrés Perea:
  Rationalizability and minimal complexity in dynamic games. 1-14
  
• Oliver Schulte:
  Iterated backward inference: an algorithm for proper rationalizability. 15-28
  
• Roland G. Fryer, Matthew O. Jackson:
  Categorical cognition: a psychological model of categories and identification in decision making: extended abstract. 29-34
  
• Pierfrancesco La Mura:
  Decision-theoretic entropy. 35-44
  
• Robert van Rooy:
  Being polite is a handicap: towards a game theoretical analysis of polite linguistic behavior. 45-58
  
• Robert McGrew, Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham:
  Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation. 59-71
  
• Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Noam Nisan:
  Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. 72-87
  
• Michael J. Kearns:
  Structured interaction in game theory. 88
  
• Dov Monderer:
  Economic efficiency versus complexity communication. 89
  
• Geir B. Asheim, Ylva Søvik:
  The semantics of preference-based belief operators. 90-103
  
• Ron van der Meyden, Manas Patra:
  Knowledge in quantum systems. 104-117
  
• Joseph Y. Halpern, Riccardo Pucella:
  Probabilistic algorithmic knowledge. 118-130
  
• Wolfgang Spohn:
  Enumerative induction. 131-144
  
• Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper:
  Multi-person unawareness. 145-158
  
• Richard Booth, Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Andreas Meyer:
  Belief liberation (and retraction). 159-172
  
• Horacio L. Arló-Costa:
  Iterated abduction and conditional coherence. 173-186
  
• Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, D. Marc Kilgour:
  Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-up. 187-200
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm:
  How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? 201-214
  
• Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco, Francesco Scarcello:
  Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games. 215-230
  
• Daniel B. Neill:
  Cooperation and coordination in the turn-taking dilemma. 231-244