7. CSFW 1994: Franconia, New Hampshire, USA

Non-Interference and Composability

• Jonathan K. Millen: Unwinding Forward Correctability. 2-10
• William D. Young, William R. Bevier: A State-Based Approach to Non-Interference. 11-21
• George W. Dinolt, Lee Benzinger, Mark Yatabe: Combining Components and Policies. 22-33

Formal Methods and Semantics

• Carol Muehrcke: Formal Methods for the Informal World. 36-46
• Adrian Spalka: Formal Semantics of Rights and Confidentiality in Definite Deductive Databases. 47-58

Model(l)ing

• Oliver Costich, John McLean, John P. McDermott: Confidentiality in a Replicated Architecture Trusted Database System: A Formal Model. 60-65
• Ravi S. Sandhu, Roshan K. Thomas: Conceptual Foundations for a Model of Task-based Authorizations. 66-79

Panel on "The General Write-Up Problem"

Cryptographic Protocol Analysis

• Catherine Meadows: A Model of Computation for the NRL Protocol Analyzer. 84-89
• Volker Kessler, Gabriele Wedel: AUTLOG - An Advanced Logic of Authentication. 90-99
• Aviel D. Rubin, Peter Honeyman: Nonmonotonic Cryptographic Protocols. 100-116

Security Policies

• Ramesh V. Peri, William A. Wulf: Formal Specification of Information Flow Security Policies and Their Enforcement in Security Critical Systems. 118-125
• Riccardo Focardi, Roberto Gorrieri: A Taxonomy of Security Properties for CCS. 126-136

Access Control

• Ravi S. Sandhu, Paul Ammann: One-Representative Safety Analysis in the Non-Monotonic Transform Model. 139-149
• Simon N. Foley: Reasoning about Confidentiality Requirements. 150-160

Panel on "Reconsidering the Role of the Reference Monitor"

• Daniel F. Sterne, Glenn S. Benson, Homayoon Tajalli: Redrawing the Security Perimeter of a Trusted System. 162-174
• Daniel F. Sterne: Panel: Reconsidering the Role fo the Reference Monitor. 175-176

Protocol Security

• Wenbo Mao, Colin Boyd: Development of Authentication Protocols: Some Misconceptions and a New Approach. 178-186
• Paul F. Syverson: A Taxonomy of Replay Attacks. 187-191
• Ulf Carlsen: Cryptographic Protocols Flaws. 192-200